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SECURE IN THEIR HOUSES? FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
AT PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS

History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too
extravagant to endure.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

At a public housing project in Chicago, several gang members
carrying guns step outside an apartment building and open fire on a car as

it passes by.2 A twenty-seven year old mother of four riding inside the

car is killed.3 The police can find no motive for the shooting. 4 At the
Brownsville Houses in New York City, a mother is shot to death as she
shields her two daughters from a shoot-out between rival drug gangs.'

Every few months newspaper headlines such as these dramatize the

problem of crime and violence in public housing projects. These stories
illustrate the climate of fear that operates on a daily basis within the

nation's housing projects. 6 This fear has been largely attributed to drug
and gang-related violence.7 The situation at Chicago's Robert Taylor

Homes, the largest housing project in the city,' is similar to that at other
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. See Phillip J. O'Connor, Gang Ambush Leaves Mother of FourDead, CFH. SUNTaMs, Nov. 15, 1995, at 12.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., David Friedman, The Ville: No Place to Be Somebody; Writer Greg
Donaldson Revisits the Mean Streets of Brownsville, Where Guns and Drugs, Kids and
Cops, and Life and Death Go Hand in Hand, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 1, 1993, at 48.
6. See, e.g., Jorge Casuso& Robert Blau, FearLives InCHA 's Taylor Homes, CHI.
TRIB., June 18, 1989, at 1 (describing the detrimental effects of crime and gang violence
on life in Chicago housing projects).
7. See id.; see also HENRY CISNEROS, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv.,
REP. TO THE PRESIDENT: COMBATING VIOLENT CRIME IN CHICAGO PuB. Hous. (1994)

(outlining efforts to be undertaken by the federal government to combat gang warfare in
Chicago housing projects).
8. See, e.g., Rob Polner, ProjectLives: Bullets May Bring No-Warrant Search to
Chicago Houses, N.Y. NMVSDAY, May 1, 1994, at A14.
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projects in large cities.9 Mothers put their children to bed in bathtubs to
protect them from stray gunfire.' 0 Children are forced to play along
terraces, screened with chain link fencing, because they are afraid to play
on the broken down playgrounds," while gang members openly deal
drugs from the building lobbies. 2
In 1988, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) began conducting
warrantless "sweeps" of public housing apartments around the city in an
effort to stem the rising tide of violence, illegal weapons, and drugs. 3
This policy, dubbed "Operation Clean Sweep," involved searching each
residential unit within a targeted building regardless of whether the tenant
consented or was home. 14 The searches were not predicated on the belief
that any one apartment contained contraband, but rather, on a general
belief that illegal items had been brought into the building.' 5 The
extensive searches included looking through tenants' closets, drawers,
refrigerators, cabinets and personal effects. 6
"Operation Clean Sweep" immediately gained attention in the media,
and was met with a good deal of community support as well as
opposition.17 Soon after the sweeps began, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) filed a class action suit on behalf of the residents, alleging
that the searches violated their Fourth Amendment rights."8 In April of
1994, a federal district court found that there was a substantial likelihood
9. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, I'm Afraid... Afraid of the Young Ones; Children Armed
to the Teeth, TerrorizeNew Orleans Housing ProjectDwellers, HoUs. CHRON., Dec. 2,
1994, at A19 (describing how young gang members and criminals have ravaged life in
New Orleans housing projects); LynneTuohy, FatherPanik Village, Where DreamsTurn
To Dust; The Last Days Of 'Panik', HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 7, 1994, at Al
(describing the decay of a housing project in Bridgeport, Conn.).
10. See Polner, supra note 8.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., William E. Schmidt, Chicago's Housing Raids Challenged, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1988, at 8 (describing the lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union in response to the CHA sweeps).
14. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Salvage Public Housing With a New Broom?, WASH.
TIMES, May 4, 1994, at A21 (describing sweeps in the context of suggesting an
alternative plan wherein all unit leases would contain weapon-free clauses. Only evidence
of this type of lease violation would justify police searches.).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Schmidt, supra note 13 (discussing positive and negative reactions to the

sweeps).
18. See id.
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that the CHA's warrantless searches of tenants' apartments violated the
Fourth Amendment19 and issued a preliminary injunction barring any
further warrantless searches.' In August of 1995, the same judge who

issued the preliminary injunction converted it into a final order,
2

permanently banning the sweeps.
The CHA's "Operation Clean Sweep" represents the sort of
aggressive tactics that have been advocated by President Clinton = and
are being considered at other housing projects around the nation.'
Proponents of such tactics have hailed them as an attempt to restore the
right of public housing tenants to be safe in their homes.' Others have
stated that CHA-type policies represent the rjext step in the loss of civil

rights accompanying the "war on drugs" that is being fought in this country. 5
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
20. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
21. See Injunction Forbids Sweeps by CHA, CI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1995, at 3.
22. See, e.g., Kevin G. Salwen, White House ProposalAllows Searches Without
Warrantsin Public Housing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A16 (describing a White
House plan that purports to address the interests of both housing authorities and citizens
whose civil rights may be affected by increased police action in public housing).
23. See Patricia Alex, Debate Sweeping Public Housing: Privacy vs. Safety, Some
Welcome Surprise Inspections, BE~aN REc., Sept. 6, 1994, at B1 (describing how
sweeps are gaining support with public housing administrators around the country).
24. See, e.g., President Clinton's Saturday Radio Address (Radio broadcast, Apr.
16, 1994). President Clinton has described tough crime fighting measures as being
necessary to take back
the right to go out to the playground, and the right to sit by an open window,
the right to walk to the corner without fear of gunfire, the right to go to school
safely in the morning and the right to celebrate your 10th birthday without
coming home to bloodshed and terror.
Id. See also Amitai Etzioni, Balancing Act; Don't Sacrifice the Common Good to
PersonalRights, CmH. TRn., May 16, 1994, at 11 (stating that warrantless sweeps are
necessary to ensure civil liberties of public housing residents).
25. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Powerful Arms of Drug War Arousing Concernfor
Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1989, at Al (describing various police programs, including
"Operation Clean Sweep," which have been accused of compromising civil rights).
Other programs besides "Operation Clean Sweep" which have been implemented to
combat the "war on drugs," and which have raised constitutional concerns include:
evictions of family members of suspected drug dealers; curfews and anti-loitering laws
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This note will analyze the constitutionality of "Operation Clean
Sweep" and other similar policies.

Part II will review the incidents

leading up to the injunction barring any further warrantless searches.2
Part III will look at the reasoning the district court used in issuing that

injunction, as well as what questions the decision left open.27 Part IV

will analyze alternative legal theories that might justify the warrantless
searches.'

Part V will consider the constitutionality of alternative search

policies that have been suggested since the district court decision came
down.'

Finally, Part VI will attempt to draw conclusions as to what

appropriate steps might be taken legally to solve the crisis in America's
housing projects.'
I.

BACKGROUND

A detailed examination of the causes of the problems beleaguering
public housing in cities around the country is beyond the scope of this
note.31 However, some contextual information regarding the history of
that allow police to cordon off areas; suspension of medicaid and food stamps from
people arrested, but not convicted, on drug charges; and forfeiture of cash and property
suspected to be involved in drug activity. Id. See also Carol Bast, The Plight of the
Minority Motorist, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 49 (1994) (questioning the constitutionality
of forfeiture program operated by a Florida county police department); Dean P.
Cazenave, Comment; CongressSteps Up War On DrugsIn PublicHousing: Has It Gone
One Step Too Far?36 LOY. L. REV. 137 (1990) (criticizing provisions of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 which authorizes eviction of public housing tenants for drug-related
activity); Richard Lacayo, CivilLiberties Could be a Casualty of Bush's War on Drugs,
TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 28 (describing possible constitutional pitfalls of President
George Bush's then newly proposed antidrug strategy); Lynne Tuohy, Court Blocks
Eviction Based on Relationship With Drug Suspect, HARTFORD COURANT, June 2, 1993,
at Cl (discussing Supreme Court of Connecticut's recent holding that housing authorities
may not evict those who share an apartment with drug dealers without providing them
with an opportunity to prove that they had no knowledge of the illegal activity).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 31-73..
27. See infra text accompanying notes 74-128.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 129-242.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 243-316.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 317-22.
31. Numerous books and articles have been written on this subject. See, e.g., Alex
Kotlowitz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF TWO BoYs GROWINO UP
IN THE OTHER AMERICA (Doubleday, 1991); Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public
Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 497 (1993) (discussing the
history of public housing and reforms aimed at correcting its ills); Martha Mahoney,
Note: Law and Racial Geography:Public Housing and the Economy in New Orleans, 42
STAN. L. REv. 1251 (1990) (discussing the history of housing projects, focusing on
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public housing is useful to an analysis of the policing practices being
employed by the CHA.
In an effort to overcome the housing shortage after World War II,

Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949.3

The Act authorized the

construction of 135,000 apartments per year from 1949 to 1954, for a

total of 810,000 new housing units. 3 The idea was that inner-city slums
would be cleared, and in their places integrated low-income housing would

be built.'

However, it was not until 1972 that all of these apartments

were finished.'

By the time the apartments were completed, the goals of the Act had
already failed.'

Physically,

construction and design.3 7

the projects were flawed in both

The projects became economically and

racially isolated, largely populated by welfare recipients and the
unemployed.3" Violence became a prevalent aspect of everyday life
within the projects.39 By 1989, it was necessary for Congress to

establish a commission charged with designing a plan to eradicate severely
physically and economically distressed public housing by the end of the
century.'
blacks in New Orleans); Nicholas Lemann, Four Generations in the Projects, N.Y.
TMIMS, Jan. 13, 1991, § 6, at 17.
32. The 1949 Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See Schill, supra note 31, at 500.
36. See Lemann, supra note 31. Lemann describes the sequence of events regarding
Chicago's housing projects as follows: In 1950, Robert Taylor, the first chairman of the
CHA, proposed building the new apartments funded by the Federal Housing Act in
neighborhoods that would allow for racial integration. Instead, the City Council rejected
these sites and the projects were built on top of the poorest tenement neighborhoods in
Chicago. In 1969, tenants' rents were fixed at a percentage of their salaries, driving
away the employed whose income could get them better deals in the private market. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, firemen, policemen and other social service providers
became reluctant to enter the projects as crime escalated. Between 1970 and 1980, betteroff residents from neighborhoods surrounding the projects began moving out, leaving
only the poor living in what the article describes as "social isolation." Id.
37.
38.
39.
40.
501-07,

See Schill, supra note 31, at 503.
See id.
See id.
See Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-235,
103 Stat. 1987, 2048-52 (1989).
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By the end of the 1980s, the Chicago Housing Authority,
administrator of the second largest public housing system in the

country,41 was reeling from the effects of these problems.

2

In June of

1988, Vincent Lane was appointed chairman of the CHA, promising to get
tough on public housing crime.43
In late September of 1988, the CHA conducted a surprise raid at its
Rockwell Gardens development, and "Operation Clean Sweep" was

born." Less than three months after the first search, the ACLU filed
suit on behalf of Chicago's 150,000 public housing residents, alleging that
the raids violated the tenants' civil rights.'

In its complaint, the ACLU

alleged that the CHA did not have the right to bring police into tenants'
apartments without search warrants.'

Also, the complaint contended

that some of the new regulations imposed by the CHA were illegal. 47

In the following months, the ACLU and the CHA conducted a series
of negotiations regarding the sweeps. 48 Despite this resistance to
"Operation Clean Sweep," the Bush administration fully supported the
CHA's efforts.49 Moreover, President Bush's Housing Secretary, Jack
41. See Edward Walsh, U.S. to Take Control of Troubled Chicago Public Housing
Authority, WASH. POST, May 28, 1995, at A25.
42. See Emily Gurnon & Patrick T. Reardon, CHA Concedesit Has Problems, Cmi.
TRIB., Apr. 8, 1995, at 1 (describing troubles at CHA projects).
43. See CHA Finally Gets Tough With Gangs, CM. TRM., Sept. 25, 1988, at 2.
44. See John Camper, 23 Arrested In Second CHA Sweep, CI. TRIB., Dec. 3,
1988, at 5. The police made only one arrest during the first operation. See id. In
December of 1988, CHA conducted its second raid, this time making twenty-three arrests
and confiscating seven illegal weapons. See id.
45. See Schmidt, supra note 13.
46. See id.
47. See id. Specifically, the complaint objected to the ban on overnight guests and
the requirement that residents show photo identification cards to obtain access to the
buildings. See id.
48. See Edward Walsh, In Chicago, a Battle Over Rights Reignites; Crime Fighting
'Sweeps' Have Public Housing Officials Under ChallengeAnew By ACLU, WASH. POST,
Dee. 19, 1993, at A3.
49. See, e.g., Jack Kemp, Drug-FreeHousingfor the Nation's Poor, WASH. POST,
Apr. 17, 1989, at A19 (commentary by Jack Kemp, supporting the aggressive tactics
taken by the Chicago Housing Authority); George E.Curry, U.S. Antidrug PlanModeled
After CHA Program, CM. TRMl., Apr. 10, 1989, at 3 (describing Kemp's national
program for removing drug dealers from pubic housing).
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Kemp, proposed a national program for warrantless searches at public

housing projects modeled after the CHA sweeps.'
By August of 1989, the ACLU and the CIIA had entered into a

consent decree approved by a federal judge.5 ' Under the terms of the

decree, tenants were to be given two days notice prior to an inspection,
unless the CHA executive director determined that an "emergency"
existed.52 Moreover, the inspections were to be conducted by CHA
personnel, not the police.' Also, the decree made access to apartments
less restrictive.'

From August of 1989 until October of 1992, the CHA conducted

inspections of apartments under the terms of the consent decree. 55

events in late 1992 and 1993 caused the legal battle to reHowever,
56
erupt.
First, in October 1992, a seven year old boy was shot and killed by
random sniper fire as he walked to school with his mother from his
apartment at the Cabrini-Greens complex.57 The CHA responded to this
incident by conducting a number of sweeps that the ACLU alleged
violated the consent decree.5" Following the sweeps, the CHA requested
that the consent decree be modified to allow metal detectors installed at

the entrance to apartment buildings, and to require residents to produce
photo identification prior to being admitted into the buildings. 59

50. See Curry, supra note 49, at 3. President Clinton and his Housing Secretary,
Henry Cisneros, have also been strong supporters of CHA's tactics. See infra notes 67
& 243-45 and accompanying text.
51. See Walsh, supra note 48.
52. See id.
53. Id. Under the decree, Chicago police may accompany CHA personnel, but may
only enter to conduct a search if the illegal contraband is discovered in plain sight, if the
tenant invites them in, or if the apartment is not leased to the occupants. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.; Rosalind Rossi, CabriniResidents ProtestSecurity Sweeps, Cm. SuNTIMS, Dec. 3, 1992, at 7.
59. See Rossi, supra note 58. Following this request, a hearing was held in federal
court. Six tenants appeared to protest the security procedures. Id. In the sweeps
following the snipei incident, resident Mark Pratt alleged that he was body-searched
seven times within one hour. Id. Another resident claims that he was subjected to nine
searches, and that his daughter began having repeated nightmares following the sweeps.
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Then, during the summer of 1993, a number of incidents occurred in
which children died after they accidentally fell out of windows.60 CHA
chairman Lane dispatched emergency maintenance crews to install window
guards.61 However, gang members fired on the crews, driving them
away.' This incident prompted Lane to abandon the consent decree and
adopt a policy of conducting warrantless sweeps whenever there were
incidents involving random gunfire.'
The ACLU responded by filing suit in federal court challenging the
constitutionality of the searches.' This suit produced a preliminary
injunction barring any further warrantless searches.'
After the
injunction was issued the legal battle over the sweeps continued.
Moreover, following the injunction, President Clinton, a strong supporter
of "Operation Clean Sweep," ordered Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros
and Attorney General Janet Reno to come up with guidelines that would
allow for maximum policing of public housing projects, without violating
the Constitution.67 The most controversial proposal that resulted from
this order would have involved having residents of public housing
apartments sign waivers consenting to warrantless searches of their
homes.'
Following issuance of the preliminary injunction, overall conditions
in Chicago's public housing projects continued to deteriorate. In May of
1995, the Federal government took control of the distressed CHA, ousting
60. See Walsh, supra note 48.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. In July and August of 1993, CHA conducted full warrantless searches
of over 1000 apartments in twelve buildings. See Harvey Grossman, Toward Increased
Security For Public Housing Residents, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 22.
64. See Walsh, supra note 48.
65. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 796 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
66. Telephone Interview with Valerie Phillips, Public Information Director, ACLU
of Illinois (Mar. 6, 1995) (stating that at that time the litigation between the ACLU and
the CHA was ongoing). The week following the Pratt decision, the same court
decertified the class representing the tenants, based on a motion by tenant intervenors
who supported the sweeps. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 155 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. I11.
1994).
67. See President Clinton's Saturday Radio Address (Radio broadcast, Apr. 9,
1994).
68. See, e.g., Ronald A. Taylor, ACLU Challenges Searches in Projects; Calls
Clinton ProposalUnconstitutional,WASH. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at 4 (describing initial
reaction to the proposal, and stating that it was vulnerable to a legal challenge). See infra
notes 243-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of this proposal.
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Chairman Lane.'

Over one year after the preliminary injunction was

issued, a permanent injunction was ordered barring future warrantless

searches.7'

That order came after the ACLU and the CHA failed to

agree on the terms of a consent decree aimed at resolving the

controversy. 7
decision.'

The CHA, however, agreed not to appeal the court's

Taking up the proposal of Attorney General Janet Reno and

Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros, the CHA replaced warrantless sweeps

with a policy of requesting that residents sign waivers consenting to
weapons searches of their apartments. 73
m. THE Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority DEcisION
In Pratt,74 the plaintiffs sought to convert a temporary restraining
order, obtained in earlier litigation,75 which prohibited any warrantless

searches by the CHA, into a preliminary injunction. 76 In order to do so,

the plaintiffs had to establish that they had a "reasonable likelihood of
success" on the merits of their case.' The district court held that the
plaintiffs had made such a showing, and granted the injunction." In

finding for the plaintiffs, the court based its opinion in the traditional

requirement that all non-consensual searches of a home be based on
to a warrant, unless exigent
probable cause, and be made pursuant
7

circumstances are shown to

exist. 1

69. See Edward Walsh, U.S. to Take Over Control of Troubled Chicago Housing
Authority, WASH. PosT, May 28, 1995, at A25.
70. See Injunction Forbids Sweeps by CHA, supra note 21.
71. See John F. Rooney, CHA to BackDown on WarrantlessSearches, Cm. DAILY
L. BULL., Aug. 3, 1995, at 1. According to the ACLU, the CHA rejected a proposed
consent decree containing terms similar to the preliminary injunction.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Four named
plaintiffs represented the tenants and legal residents in the class action suit. Id. at 793.
The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Id.
75. See id. at 793 (stating that the court issued a temporary restraining order on
Feb. 14, 1994).
76. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793.
77. Id. at 794.
78. Id. at 796.
79. Id. at 795.
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In drawing this conclusion, the court relied on a line of cases,

including the seminal case of Payton v. New York." In Payton, the
defendants challenged New York statutes which authorized the police to
enter the home of a suspected felon, without a warrant, in order to make
an arrest."' In finding the statutes unconstitutional, the Court stated that
"physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed."' The Court went on to hold that
"[ult is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable."'

Based on this reasoning, the Pratt court found that the CHA's
warrantless entry into tenants' apartments was presumptively a violation
of the Fourth Amendment? In order to overcome this presumption, the
CHA had to establish both the existence of exigent circumstances for the
sweeps, as well as probable cause to search each apartment.' The CHA
failed both prongs of this analysis."6 First, the court noted that the
searches took place anywhere from 48 hours to a few days after the
shooting incidents which the CHA claimed authorized the searches.'
The court concluded that this extended time span between the incidents
prompting the searches and the actual searches themselves precluded any
claim of exigency. 8 Next, the court found that even if the CHA had
been able to establish the existence of exigent circumstances, the policy of
searching every single apartment within a targeted building, regardless of
80. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Court also relied on United States v. Berkowitz, 927
F.2d 1376 (1991), aftd, 972 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that evidence found in
defendant's home would have to be suppressed if IRS agents followed defendant into his
home prior to placing him under arrest); and on Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025 (7th
Cir. 1987) (stating that police may not enter a person's home absent exigent
circumstances). Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 795.
81. Payton, 445 U.S. at 574.
82. Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of
Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313).
83. Id. at 586 (quoting Coolidgev. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971).
84. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 795.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 795-96.
87. Id. at 795.
88. Id.
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suspicion that any individual apartment contained contraband, negated the
existence of probable cause.89
The Pratt decision leaves open a number of questions. First, the
decision notes that the CHA may still conduct "searches in response to an
existing emergency or clear and present danger when there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed."' The court gives as
an example of this, police observing members of a gang, engaged in a
shoot-out, entering a building. 9' Under these circumstances, if the police
promptly surround the building, they would be authorized to conduct
warrantless door to door searches of apartments in that building.' The
court does not give any definition of "promptly," I therefore, if the CHA
were to improve upon its response time to gang-related shootings,
arguably, it might be able to conduct building sweeps under the court's
holding.' However, as the court stated, the reason that the sweeps were
delayed for two or more days was because of the practical requirements
of rounding up enough personnel to secure the perimeters of a targeted
building.9' Consequently, the logistics involved in organizing a building
sweep96would seem to preclude any significantly quicker action by the
CHA.
More important, however, is the question of how the Pratt decision
might be viewed by an appellate court, or courts in other jurisdictions.
Although the CHA agreed not to appeal the order granting the permanent
injunction, that does not mean that the agency agrees that sweeps are
89. Id. at 796. In drawing this conclusion, the Court relied on United States v.
Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that police may not search individual
units within an apartment building unless there is probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence is located within the unit), and on United States v. Higgins, 428 F.2d 232 (7th
Cir. 1970) (holding that warrant authorizing a search of a basement apartment in a
building with three basement apartments did not allow police to search all three
apartments).
90. Pratt, 898 F. Supp. at 797.
91. Id. at n.2.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 24 (noting that the Pratt decision might not apply
if searches occurred closer to shootings).
95. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793.
96. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 155 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that
logistical problems prevented the CHA from conducting searches any sooner).
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unconstitutional. 97
The possibility always remains that should
circumstances change, the CHA might implement a search policy similar
to "Operation Clean Sweep" based on a slightly different justification.98
Further, given the dire circumstances in other housing projects around the
nation, another housing agency might seek to implement an expansive
warrantless search policy. Bearing this in mind, a closer examination of
the case is in order.
The Fourth Amendment has long been interpreted as requiring that,
except under carefully delineated circumstances, searches be conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued on no less than probable cause.'
In
Johnson v. United States,1"' the Supreme Court described the importance
of the warrant as follows
[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is
also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule,
to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent.1 °1
97. Telephone Interview with Steve Laduzinsky, Assistant General Counsel, CHA
(Dec. 1, 1995) (stating that the CHA chose not to appeal the decision because it felt that
it could "live with the injunction").
98. Telephone Interview with Valeria J. Phillips, Public Information Director,
ACLU of Illinios (Dec. 1, 1995) (stating that the ACLU thought that the first consent
decree entered into in 1989 would have precluded further warrantless searches, however,
the CHA began conducting more sweeps in 1993, this time calling them gun searches).
99. See generally Scott E. Sundby, A Return to FourthAmendment Basics: Undoing
the Mischief of Camaraand Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 385-90 (1988) (reviewing
history of Supreme Court's presumption that Fourth Amendment requires searches be
conducted pursuant to warrants issued on probable cause). Although the Fourth
Amendment has been interpreted as requiring a warrant in most circumstances, it is also
contended that the Fourth Amendment is governed by the "reasonableness clause." See
Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197 (1993) (stating that the Supreme Court has wavered between reading the Fourth
Amendment as being governed by the "warrant clause" and the "reasonableness clause");
see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,107 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment only requires that government act
reasonably); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 820 (1994) (arguing that modern law enforcement practices require that the Fourth
Amendment be governed by the "warrant clause").
100. 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (holding that even though police officers clearly smelled
opium in hallway of hotel, warrant issued by magistrate was required to enter room).
101. Id. at 14.
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However, even in Johnson, the Court recognized that exigent
circumstances provide an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment."°
The exigency exception continues to be
recognized by courts."°3 The premise of the exception is that sometimes
the need for effective law enforcement requires dispensing with the
warrant requirement when the "compelling need for official action" makes

obtaining a warrant impracticable."°
Despite general agreement that the presence of exigent circumstances

allows for a warrantless search, courts are not in agreement as to what

constitutes exigency. 0 5 Numerous tests have been applied to determine

whether or not exigent circumstances exist."°

In Payton v. New

York,"0 7 the Court noted that the presence of exigent circumstances

would justify a warrantless entry into a home; however, the Court
declined

to

exigency.' 5

define exactly

what sort of emergencies

comprise

Five years later, in Welsh v. Wisconsin,"° the Supreme

Court acknowledged that it had left the definition of exigent circumstances
to the lower courts, but noted that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
102. Id. at 14-15.
103. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (recognizing exigent
circumstances exception, but holding that it does not apply to murder investigation);
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (holding that exigent circumstances allowed
firefighters to make a warrantless entry into burning building, but not to conduct a four
day investigation); United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that exigent circumstances were established to make warrantless entry into room where
narcotics were being sold).
104. 7yler, 436 U.S. at 499. See generally Comment: Jacqueline Bryks, Exigent
Circumstancesand WarrantlessHome Entries: United States v. MacDonald,57 BROOK.
L. REV. 307 (1991) (comment on narrowing Fourth Amendment by expanding notion of
exigent circumstances for narcotics); Amy B. Belier, Comment: United States v.
MacDonald: The Exigent Circumstances Exception and the Erosion of the Fourth
Amendment, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407 (1991) (analysis of cases focusing on exigent
circumstances).
105. See generally Belier, supra note 104, at 410-14 (describing different tests
applied to determine exigent circumstances).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Dorman, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane)
(factors to be considered in determining exigency include: gravity of offense; whether
suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; probable cause to believe that suspect has
committed the crime; strong reason to believe suspect is on the premises; likelihood of
escape; and peaceful circumstances of the entry).
107. 445 U.S. 573 (1979).
108. Id. at 583.
109. 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (holding that warrantless arrest of defendant in his home
for driving while intoxicated was not justified by exigent circumstances).
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110
warrant requirement, "are few in number and carefully delineated."
Further, the Court stated that "the police bear a heavy burden when
attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless
searches or arrests."11 The Welsh Court went on to list the examples
of exigencies which it has recognized: hot pursuit of a felon, destruction
of evidence, and an ongoing fire."? Moreover, the Court noted that
only "hot pursuit" has allowed warrantless arrests in the home. 13
More recently, in Minnesota v. Olsen," 4 the Supreme Court held
that the Minnesota Supreme Court applied "essentially the correct
standard" in determining that exigent circumstances did not justify a
warrantless entry into a home to arrest a defendant suspected of driving
the getaway car used in a robbery-murder. "15 Under the Minnesota test,
a warrantless search may be justified by the exigency of hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence, the need to prevent a
suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons
inside or outside the dwelling. 16 The Minnesota court also noted that,
absent hot pursuit, there must be at least probable cause to117believe that
Although
one of the other factors justifying the entrance was present.
the Supreme Court approved of the Minnesota court's findings, it limited
its holding to the specific facts of the case and chose not to announce a
bright line exigent circumstances test."' Alternatively, the Seventh
Circuit, of which the district court in Pratt is a part, has defined the test
for exigent circumstances as "whether the exceedingly strong privacy
interest in one's residence is outweighed by the risk that delay will
engender injury, destruction of evidence, or eseape.' 9

110. Id. at 749 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of
Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972)).
111. Id. at 749-50.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
115. Id. at 100-01.
116. See id. at 100.
117. See id.
118. Id. The Court limited its holding by stating, "[w]e are not inclined to disagree
with this fact-specific application of the proper legal standard." Id.
119. See United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 458 (7th Cir.) (holding that exigent
circumstances did not justify police's warrantless entry into hotel room of suspected drug
dealer), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857 (1987); United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 71
(7th Cir.) (holding that attempting to prevent drug dealer from escaping justified
warrantless entry of apartment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
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Both the Olsen test and the test previously applied by the Seventh
Circuit seem to stress imminence versus privacy as the crucial factors to
be weighed in determining whether or not exigent circumstances exist.
Further, both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have stated that
the government bears the burden of proving the presence of exigent
circumstances.' 20 Although the Pratt court did not explicitly state what
the appropriate test is for determining exigency, it is unlikely that the
CHA or another housing agency with a similar policy, could prove that
exigent circumstances justified the sweeps. The CHA purported to base
its search policy on exigency.12 ' The exigent circumstances which the
CHA put forth as preconditions to a sweep were: random gunfire from
buildings; intimidation at gunpoint; or shootings if guns are taken inside
CHA buildings.'
Under these conditions, the CHA stated that if police
can not determine which apartment the weapons are taken into, a sweep
may be authorized."
However, the sweeps took at least two days
before they began. 1" Under the circumstances, the CHA could not
claim that the sweeps fall under the heading "hot pursuit " " or risk of
danger to the public. Further, the CHA has not offered any reason to
believe that weapons, once brought into a building, are then taken inside
apartments where they remain during the time it takes to organize a
sweep. In fact, comparisons of the numbers of weapons seized from
common areas to the number of weapons seized in apartments indicate that
weapons are not brought into tenants' apartments. 12 This would seem
to negate the claim that the searches are necessary to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence and the presence of probable cause to search any
one apartment.
Additionally, the CHA has not offered any reason why it could not
obtain a warrant at the same time that it instigates procedures to conduct
a sweep. The district court specifically noted that even under emergency
circumstances that would justify a warrantiess door to door search, once
the search is under way, a warrant issued by a detached magistrate should
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; Diaz, 814 F.2d at 458.
See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
See id. at 794.
See id.

124. See id. at 793.
125. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (stating that "hot
pursuit" involves some sort of an actual chase).
126. See, e.g., Harvey Grossman, Toward IncreasedSecurity For Public Housing
Residents, Cmi. DAILY L. BuLL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 22 (stating that after four days of
sweeps, the CHA only recovered 23 weapons, while a few days of CHA police patrolling
common areas resulted in 24 weapons being recovered).
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Consequently, under the traditional requirement that

warrantless searches of homes should be limited to carefully delineated

circumstances," s it is likely that the CHA-type sweeps will be found to
violate the Fourth Amendment.
IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has purported to hold
warrantless searches presumptively unconstitutional, '9 numerous
exceptions to the warrant requirement have been established over the

years. 1

Critics have noted that as the Supreme Court has shifted from

a bright line rule to a "reasonableness" analysis of Fourth Amendment
questions, the warrant requirement has become more and more the

exception rather than the rule.'

Although the Pratt court found that

there was a reasonable likelihood that under the traditional warrant and
probable cause analysis, "Operation Clean Sweep" violated the Fourth
Amendment,132 alternative exceptions resulting from the Court's

reasonableness approach have been advocated as sanctioning the search
127. See Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 797 n.2.
128. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (holding that an
important consideration in determining whether exigency exists is the gravity of the
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made).
129. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1979) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's
home in order to make a routine arrest).
130. See Amar, supra note 99 (noting the many exceptions to the warrant rule);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) ("plain view" exception); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) ("stop and frisk" exception); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) (automobile exception).
131. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 340 (1990) (Brennan, J. dissenting)
(noting the "'emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision'
from a narrow exception into one that 'swallows the general rule that searches are
'reasonable' only if based upon probable cause'") (quoting United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 714 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result); see generally Amar, supranote
99; Tracey Maclin, The CentralMeaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 197 (1993) (discussing use and purpose of Fourth Amendment and its viability
in today's society); Steiker, supra note 99; Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischiefof Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383
(1988) (discussing the Court's inappropriate treatment of the Fourth Amendment's
warrant clause in Camara and Terry).
132. See Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 794.
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policy.133
Specifically, the "special needs" doctrine"M has been
offered as justifying expanded authority to conduct otherwise
impermissible searches.135 Under the "special needs" doctrine, probable
cause gives way and in its place
the court determines if the government's
"special need for flexibility"136 in carrying out the particular job in
question outweighs an individual's expectation of privacy. 37
Accordingly, CHA-type warrantless sweep policies might be justified

as 'necessary to carrying out a housing authority's responsibility of

providing a safe living environment for its tenants. 131 In order to
evaluate the likelihood of success of this argument it is necessary to
review the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence upon which the

"special needs" doctrine is based.

For much of this nation's history, the Fourth Amendment has been
interpreted by the courts as requiring searches to be made pursuant to a
warrant, issued upon nothing less than probable cause.' 39 However, two

cases from the late 1960s, Camara v. Municipal Court?' and Terry v.

Ohio, 4' set the stage for a relaxation of that requirement.142 First, in

133. See Steven Yarosh, Is Operation Clean Sweep Sweeping Away the Fourth
Amendment, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1103 (1992) (concluding that the "special needs"
exception to the Fourth Amendment justifies warrantless searches); Edward Felsenthal,
High Court May Back Some Gun Sweeps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at B12
(speculating that Supreme Court may find that extreme conditions at public housing
justifies warrantless searches).
134. The "special needs" doctrine was first acknowledged by the Supreme Court by
Justice Blackmun in a dissenting opinion to a 1983 case. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Royer, the majority held that a drug
enforcement agent exceeded his authority in detaining a suspect. Justice Blackmun would
have allowed the detention based on the special needs of the government in uncovering
drug couriers. Id. Although Justice Blackmun's view did not prevail in that case, just
two years later the "special needs" doctrine gained acceptance in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
135. See Yarosh, supra note 133; Felsenthal, supra note 133.
136. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Robert Teir, Are WarrantlessSearchesfor Guns in Public Housing
Projects Justified? Yes: Living Without Fear is the Most Important Right, A.B.A. J.,
July, 1994, at 40 (arguing that the dire conditions at Chicago's public housing projects
demonstrate a "special need" and the goal of the sweeps is to make the buildings safe for
the residents).
139. See Maelin, supra note 99, at 204-05.
140. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
141. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Camara, the Supreme Court held that probable cause could be established
based on the reasonableness of the government's goals.143 In Camara,
the defendant challenged the right of a housing inspector to conduct a
warrantless inspection of his premises."
Upon review, the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did apply to housing inspections
and that a warrant was required. 4 However, the Court went on to state
that in issuing such a warrant, the housing inspector need not show
probable cause that any individual dwelling violated the housing
codes. 14 Instead, the Court held that probable cause must be evaluated
in terms of reasonableness, and reasonableness, in turn, is determined by
weighing the government's need to search against the invasion which the
search entails. 47
Although the Court held that a search must be conducted based on
probable cause, the Camara decision changed the definition of probable
cause.1 48 Prior to Camara, a search was reasonable if it was based on
probable cause, while after Camara, probable cause would be found if the
proposed search was reasonable. 49
This weakening of the probable cause requirement was taken one step
further in Terry v. Ohio. In Terry, the defendant moved to suppress two
revolvers offered in evidence by the prosecution.)" The weapons had
been discovered during a pat-down search by a police officer who had
become suspicious of the defendant who was loitering in front a store.'
At trial, the officer testified that he stopped the defendant based on his
thirty-five years of experience as a detective. 52
The trial court rejected the prosecution's argument that the officer had
probable cause to arrest the defendant. 53 The trial court, nevertheless,
denied the defendant's motion and held that, based on the officer's
142. See generally Sundby, supra note 99 (extensive discussion of Camara and
Terry).
143. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.
144. Id. at 525.
145. Id. at 534.
146. Id. at 538.
147. Id. at 536-37.
148. See Sundby, supra note 99.
149. See Gerald S. Reamy, When Special Needs Meet ProbableCause:Denying the
Devil Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1992); Sundby, supra note 99.
150. Teny, 392 U.S. at 5.
151. Id. at 6-7.

152. Id.
153. Id. at 7-8.
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experience, he had reasonable cause to conduct an interrogation. 14 The
defendant's conviction was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Ohio.' 55
Upon review, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the defendant had
56
been subjected to a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
However, the Court rejected the requirement that all police searches be
conducted based on probable cause, holding that the officer's actions must
be judged against a standard of reasonableness. 7 The Court, relying
on Camara, went on to hold that the test for determining the
reasonableness of a search requires a balancing of the police's need to
search against the intrusion involved in the search.'5 8
The effect of Camara and Terry was that challenges to particular
government practices brought under the Fourth Amendment would now
be assessed by conducting a balancing test weighing the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests. 5 9 In the years following Camara and
Terry, numerous cases were decided under this balancing test.
In 1985, the Supreme Court expanded on this balancing test to
conclude that certain administrative needs of the government require
modifying "the level of illicit activity needed to justify a search."" In
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,161 a high school freshman was caught smoking
in a school bathroom. 62 Subsequently, the school's Vice Principal
opened the student's purse, in which he discovered some marijuana."
The student moved to have the marijuana suppressed as evidence on the
grounds 4 that the search of her purse violated her Fourth Amendment
rights.
Upon review, the Supreme Court held that school officials did not
need a warrant before searching students subject to the school's
authority."
Justice White, writing for the majority, began by noting
154. Id. at 8.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 9.
157. Id. at 20.
158. Id. at 20-21.
159. See Sundby, supra note 99, at 395-97.
160. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 328.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 329.
165. Id. at 340.
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that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches of students by public
school officials. 1" However, relying on Camara, Justice White stated
that the reasonableness of a search depended on a balancing of interests,
and that balance would be affected by the context within which the search
took place. 7 In finding in favor of the government's interests the
Court relied on a number of factors: the substantial interest of school
administrators in maintaining discipline on school grounds; the difficulty
of maintaining order within a school environment; and the value of
preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship."
The
totality of these factors, Justice White reasoned, required a "certain degree
of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures," and merited easing search
restrictions. 6
In a separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun expounded on why the
balance favored upholding the search, in what has become the standard
analysis of the "special needs" doctrine.17 He wrote, "[o]nly in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests of
that of the Framers.""7 Justice Blackmun's opinion makes clear that it
is factors beyond regular law enforcement that justify loosening the Fourth
Amendment restrictions. Accordingly, in T.L. 0., it was not apprehending
illicit drug users that justified the warrantless search, but rather it was the
need to maintain a safe environment conducive to learning."7 Given the
frequency with which problems threatening such an environment come up,
it would not be practical for a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching
a student.' 73
The "special needs" doctrine was further expanded to apply to the
warrantless search of a home in the case of Giffin v. Wisconsin. 7 4 In
Griffin, the defendant, who had been on probation, was convicted of
violating a state weapons law after a gun was discovered in his home
166. Id. at 333.
167. Id. at 337.
168. Id. at 339-40.
169. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
170. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A
Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of ConstitutionalRights, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 285 (1991) (attributing Justice Blackmun's concurrenceas being the definition of the
"special needs" doctrine).
171. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
173. Id.
174. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).

NOTE: SECURE IN THEIR HOUSES?

19951

during a warrantless search of the premises.'
The search was
conducted pursuant to a regulation of the Wisconsin State Department of
Health and Social Services, which authorized probation officers to search
a probationer's home without a warrant if reasonable grounds existed to
believe that contraband was present. 76 At trial, the defendant's motion
to have the evidence seized during the search suppressed was
dismissed.'" The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
holding that probation diminishes a probationer's reasonable expectation
of privacy.'
Accordingly, the court held that any search of a
probationer's home 1would
be constitutional so long as it was based on
79
reasonable grounds.
While affirming the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision, the
Supreme Court chose not to adopt the broad holding that any search of a
probationer's home based on reasonable grounds would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment."
Instead, the Court, while acknowledging that a
probationer's home is protected by the Fourth Amendment, affirmed the
decision by relying on the "special needs" line of cases. 8'
The Court reasoned that, like schools and other governmental
agencies, there were special needs beyond normal law enforcement
involved in operating a state probation system." Specifically, the Court
relied on the fact that probationers only enjoy conditional liberty and are
subject to special restrictions.iu One of the chief restrictions of a
probation system is that probationers be closely supervised.' "
It was this special need for supervision that the Court held justified
replacing the warrant and probable cause standard of the Fourth
Amendment with the reasonableness standard." A warrant requirement
would interfere with the ability of a probation officer to respond to the
need to supervise probationers, thereby reducing effectiveness of the
state's probation system."16 The Court also noted that a probation
175. Id. at 872.
176. Id. at 870-71.
177. Id. at 872.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

873.
873-74.
874.
875.
876.
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officer is not a police officer, but rather an employee of the state,
operating with the welfare of the probationer in mind.", Therefore,
dispensing with the warrant requirement within this limited context would
not subject the probationer to warrantless investigatory searches.' 88
The next major expansion of the "special needs" doctrine came in the
case of National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab."9 In that
case, the Supreme Court allowed blanket drug testing for Customs Service
employees directly involved in drug interdiction, as well as employees
required to carry firearms."9 The Court allowed such testing, despite
the lack of individual suspicion that any employee was using drugs.19 '
Again, the Court's holding was based on the "special needs" doctrine." 9
The Court began by noting that drug testing did constitute a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes."93 However, the Court found that the
Customs Service's drug testing program was not directed at ordinary law
enforcement. 1" In fact, the program prohibited criminal prosecution of
an employee found to be using drugs without the employee's consent. 19s
Instead, the program was designed to detect and deter drug use among
employees holding or applying for sensitive positions within the Customs
Service."' The Court held that under these circumstances, requiring an
individual warrant would not be practical and would interfere with the
pressing mission of the Customs Service." 9
The Court, in weighing the government's interests involved in
conducting the tests noted that the national security interests which the
Customs Service serves "could be irreparably damaged" if drug use
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
190. Id. at 664-65. The Court remanded for further proceedings a requirement that
employees with access to "classified" material be subjected to warrantless drug testing.
Id. at 679.
191. Id. at 668. In fact the Commissioner of the Customs Service acknowledged that
there was very little drug use by employees in the Customs Service. Id.at 660.
192. Id. at 665. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
decided the same day as Von Raab, the Court also relied on the "special needs" doctrine
to uphold a policy established by the Federal Railroad Administration of conducting
warrantless alcohol and drug testing of railroad employees involved in accidents. Id.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 666.
Id.
ld.

197. Id. at 667.
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affected the employee's job performance.1 9 The Court further stated
that despite the potential for substantial interference of privacy involved
in drug testing, the "operational realities of the workplace" made
reasonable certain intrusions that would be unreasonable in another
context." 9
Therefore, due to the sensitive nature of the Customs
Service, the employees had a diminished expectation of privacy that could
not outweigh the government's need to conduct the tests.'
Finally, the most recent development in the "special needs" doctrine
came in the case of Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,20 '
where the Supreme Court held that stopping all vehicles at a sobriety
checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment.20 This was so, even
though the purpose of the stops was to conduct a regular law enforcement
activity-arresting drunk drivers.'
Citing Von Raab, the plaintiffs in Sitz argued that, since the sobriety
checks were not serving a special need beyond the normal needs of law
enforcement, the "special needs" doctrine did not apply and, therefore,
balancing was inappropriate. 0 4 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, held that nothing in Von Raab or other "special
needs" cases was intended to repudiate earlier cases involving police stops
of motorists on public highways. 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist, therefore,
held that the appropriate test was to balance the state's interest in
preventing accidents caused by drunken driving, the effectiveness of
sobriety checkpoints in doing so, and the intrusion on individual privacy
rights.'
The Court held that under this test, the state's interest 2in7
preventing accidents outweighed the motorists' privacy interests. 0
First, the Court noted the magnitude of the problem of drunken driving in
the United States." 8 Then the Court went on to assess the intrusion on
motorists incurred by the checkpoints.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist found
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 670.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
Id. at 455.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 449-50.

at 450-55.
at 455.
at 451.
at 451-52.
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that the stops were brief, imposing the sort of minimum intrusion on
motorists which had previously been held constitutional.21 o
Finally, the Court addressed the effectiveness of the sobriety
checkpoints in apprehending drunk drivers."1 Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that in evaluating effectiveness, it was not the Court's job to decide
which among a number of reasonable law enforcement techniques should
be employed to deal with a serious public danger.212 Therefore, even
though the number of drunk drivers that were arrested at the checkpoints
was very low, the Court would not find that the program was
ineffective.213 Based on this balancing of factors, the Court held that the
sobriety checkpoints did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 1 4
An analysis of the "special needs" doctrine establishes that the
traditional warrant and probable cause requirements have been severely
eroded.21
As the Supreme Court has embraced a reasonableness
approach to Fourth Amendment challenges, it has allowed for warrantless
searches of schools, 1 6 homes,217 the workplace218 and cars.219
Further, the Court has, in certain instances, waived the requirement that
probable cause requires individualized suspicion.'
Based on these
cases, the possibility exists for further expansion of the "special needs"
doctrine. 12
However, "Operation Clean Sweep" is distinguishable from "special
needs" cases in a number of ways. First, the key to the doctrine remains
"special needs" beyond the normal need for law enforcement.m
However, there is no indication that the CHA owes its tenants any more
210. Id.
211. Id. at 453-55.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 453.
Id. at 455.
Id.
See Reamey, supra note 149; Strossen, supra note 170, at 348.
216. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1984):
217. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
218. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
219. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
220. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Sitz, 496 U.S. 444.
221. See generally Strossen, supra note 170 (discussing how Sitz line of cases has
eroded the Fourth Amendment).
222. See T.L.O., 469 at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

1995]

NOTE: SECURE IN T=EIR HOUSES?

of a duty of safety than any other landlord.'

Courts have held that

government agencies may have an affirmative duty of protection under a
"state-created-danger" or "enhancement of risk" theory.'
Under these
theories, the government is liable for injuries that it helped create or
enhanced the risk of occurring.' s Arguably, public housing authorit
policies have created the danger at housing projects around the nation.'
However, even if that is the case, it should not justify allowing housing
authorities to abrogate constitutional rights to correct the situation that they
created.Y7

Further, the time gap between the circumstances justifying the
searches and the searches themselves indicates that the CHA is not acting

pursuant to an exigency theory, but rather, it is merely conducting a
regular law enforcement

activity'

following the commission of a crime.'

by searching for

contraband

In fact, the sweeps have been

described in the media as being a crime fighting measure, not an
As the Supreme Court stated in Camara v.
administrative regulation.'
223. See Karen M. Blum, Deshaney: Custody, Creation ofDanger& Culpability,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 435, 457-59 (1994) (stating that unlike public schools, courts
have held that there is no affirmative duty for administrators of public housing authorities
to protect public housing residents); B.A. Glesner, Landlordsas Cops, 42 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 679 (1992) (describing how, although limited exceptions have developed,
landlords are not traditionally responsible for criminal acts perpetrated on their property);
see also Dawson v. Milwaukee Hous. Auth., 930 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
Milwaukee housing authority was not liable to public housing resident plaintiff who was
shot by another public housing resident, even though plaintiff requested to be moved to
another location).
224. Dawson, 930 F.2d at 1284.
225. Id.
226. See Schill, supra note 31 (stating that in the 1970s, police and firemen became
a scarce sight at public housing projects); see also Emily Gurmon & Patrick T. Reardon,
CHA Concedes it Has Problems, CI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 1994, at 1 (describing how poorly
designed and constructed CHA buildings have further deteriorated due to neglect by CHA
administrators).
227. See Strossen, supra note 170 (arguing that expediency should not be considered
a "special need").
228. It is important to note that CHA sweeps were carried out by CHA police,
which have the same authority as city police. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F.
Supp. 792, 793 (N.D. I1. 1994).
229. See Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint for Declarator and Injunctive Relief at
1-2, Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority, 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Il. 1994) (No. 93-C6985) (stating that sweeps are conducted primarily for law enforcement purposes).
230. See Carlos Sanchez, Fulwood Sworn In as Chief, Asks Community for Help,
WASH. PoST, Aug. 5, 1989, at Bi.
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Municipal Court, ," "in a criminal investigation, the police may
undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But... [doing
so] would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in
the hope that these goods might be found."'2
Further, unlike Griffin and Von Raab, public housing residents do not
have a diminished expectation of privacy in their apartments. 3 Given
the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the "physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which . . . the Fourth Amendment is
directed,"' even under a reasonableness analysis, the tenants' interest
in privacy weighs strongly in favor of finding the sweeps unreasonable.
Finally, it is important to note that although the purpose of the
roadblocks in Sitz was to apprehend drunk drivers, a relatively normal law
enforcement activity, 5 the Court's holding was based specifically on
the fact that the searches involved were of cars. 6 As such, the
majority distinguished the roadblocks in question from other "special
needs" cases,2 37 and justified its holding on a line of cases involving
automobiles and public highways."
Further, the Court relied on the
fact that the
searches
involved
only
minimal
intrusion and only took a few
seconds.23'
In contrast, the CHA sweeps took place in residents' homes and
involved extensive searching by the police.' °
Based on these
differences, any attempt to extend the reasoning of Sitz to justify
warrantless searches of public housing residents' apartments is likely to be
rejected by a court."1 To apply the holding of Sitz and other "special
needs" cases to warrantless searches of the home conducted to uncover
231. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

232. Id. at 535.
233. See, e.g., Richmond Tenants Org. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300 (4th Cir. 1992)
(discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy in a home and applying that expectation
to a public housing apartment).
234. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1979) (quoting United States v
United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
235. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 451.
238. Id.

239. Id. at 452.
240. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793.
241. See, e.g., Georgia Ass'n of Educatorsv. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110, 1114 n.4
(N.D. Ga. 1990) (distinguishing Sitz as only applying to highway checkpoints and not
other more intrusive searches).
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evidence of criminal activity would mean the end of both the warrant and
the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.2'
V.

ALTERNATIVE SEARCH POLICIES

Two days after the Prattdecision came down, President Clinton, who
had supported the CHA's warrantless search policy, ordered Attorney
General Janet Reno and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Henry Cisneros to come up with guidelines that would allow for maximum
policing of public housing while still comporting with the
Constitution. 3
In a letter to the President dated April 14, 1994, Attorney General
Reno and Secretary Cisneros offered a proposed set of guidelines
regarding policing practices to be employed at housing projects around the
nation.'
One of the main proposals offered in that letter is that
residents of public housing sign forms, appended to their leases,
consenting to warrantless searches of their apartments when "crime
conditions in the housing development make unit-by-unit inspections
essential. ""
The Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development subsequently put forth a pamphlet outlining their
proposals.'
These proposals were endorsed in a resolution by the
United States Senate.247 More recently, however, due to public criticism
of the proposal, the Clinton administration has backed off on its
endorsement of consent forms authorizing warrantless searches."
Nevertheless, the CHA has adopted a policy of requesting that residents
242. See Strossen, supra note 170 at 347 (stating that after Sitz, the Fourth
Amendment would be completely eviscerated if the requirements that "special needs"
searches be unintrusive and brief and be conducted for "special, non-criminal law
enforcement purposes" were to be eliminated).
243. See President Clinton's Saturday Radio Address (Radio broadcast, Apr. 9,
1994).
244. Letter from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen., and Henry Cisneros, Secretary of Hous.
and Urban Dev., to President Clinton (Apr. 14, 1994).

245. Id. at 2.
246. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. AND U.S.

DEP'T OF

Hous.

AND URBAN DEV.,

GUIDANCE ON PUB. Hous. SEC. (1994) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON PUB. Hous. SEC.].
247. See S. Res. 540, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
248. See, e.g., Kathleen Best, Gun-Search Plan Loses Luster; Cisneros, With
Housing Officials, Hedges On Proposals, ST. LoUis POST-DISPATCH, May 5, 1994, at
7A (detailing the hesitancy of HUD to authorize implementation of public housing leases
containing advance-consent clauses allowing police searches).
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sign a voluntary search consent form at the time they sign their lease. 2
Also, such a proposal has been offered elsewhere, and remains a
possibility for the future.' s In discussing the use of consent clauses in
public housing leases in their letter to President Clinton, Attorney General
Reno and Secretary Cisneros left it unclear whether such clauses could be
made a mandatory condition to obtaining public housing. 2'z
A. Mandatory Consent
The Department of Justice and Department of Housing and Urban
Development have acknowledged that any attempt to make consent to gun
searches a mandatory provision of public housing leases raises serious
constitutional issues. 2
Moreover, the Senate, in approving the
guidelines that would include consent clauses, specifically stated that its
approval was conditioned on the clauses being optional.5 3 Additionally,

the possibility of mandatory consent clauses raised an immediate outcry
from the ACLU.'

4

The reason for this concern over mandatory consent forms is that,
under the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government may

not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary give up a
constitutional right, even though the government is under no obligation to
grant the benefit at all.' s
249. See Rooney, supra note 71.
250. See, e.g., Edward J. Boyer, Security Plan DrawsFire;Safety: PublicHousing
Residents Pan the ProposalforMetal Detectors and Gun Searches atL.A. Projects,L.A.
TIMES, April 19, 1994, at B1 (criticizing the proposal for warrantless searches in Los
Angeles projects); Jerry Demarco, The Newest Way to Fight Crime; PattersonLaunches
Sweep at Housing Project, BERGEN REc., Dec. 7, 1994, at BI (describing how
Patterson, New Jersey is using consent clauses to conduct sweeps modeled after
"Operation Clean Sweep").
251. Letter from Janet Reno and Henry Cisneros to President Clinton, supra note
244, at 2-3.
252. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., supra note 246, at 3.
253. See S. Res. 540, supra note 247.
254. See Taylor, supranote 68; see also Memorandum from Loren Siegel, Director
of ACLU Dep't of Pub. Educ. to Affiliate ACLU Directors (Apr. 18, 1994) (informing
ACLU personnel of its objection to consent forms).
255. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward A Positive Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990); Kathleen Sullivan,
UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415 (1989).
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The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" was recognized by the
Supreme Court as early as 1877 in the case of Barron v. Burnside256
The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that the government cannot
indirectly deny constitutional rights that it could not directly deny.'
Despite the seemingly straight-forward purpose of the doctrine and its
age, critics have noted that it is difficult to predict when a challenge based
on unconstitutional conditions will be successful, and that in recent years,
the Supreme Court has limited its application." 5
One theory regarding the doctrine is that the Supreme Court has
applied it in cases where unconstitutional conditions have a coercive effect
on individual rights.-59 An example of this is Speiser v. Randall,'where the Court held that it was a violation of the First Amendment to
require veterans to take a loyalty oath in order to receive a veteran's tax
exemption." The majority reasoned that to do so was to penalize those
veterans who exercised their First Amendment rights by refusing to take
the oath.'a
Five years later in Sherbert v. Verner,' the Court reversed a ruling
denying unemployment benefits to a woman who, for religious reasons,
refused to accept a job that required her to work on Saturdays.'
Again, the Court reasoned that to do so was tantamount to punishing the
woman for exercising her rights to religious freedom.'
The thrust of these cases seems to be that the government actions in
question had a deterrent effect on individual exercise of constitutional
rights. '
However, the Court has rejected challenges based on
unconstitutional conditions when it has found that the deterrent effect is
256. 121 U.S. 186 (1877). See generally Sullivan, supranote 255, for a history of
the doctrine.
257. See Sullivan, supra note 255.
258. See generally id. See also Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360
(1988) (unconstitutional conditions doctrine held not to apply to federal act which
prohibited food stamps from being distributed to any family while members of the family
were on strike); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
(unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not invalidate federal income tax law barring
nonprofit organizations from using tax-deductible contributions for lobbying activity).
259. See Sullivan, supra note 255, at 1428-56.
260. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
261. Id. at 529.
262. Id. at 518.
263. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
264. Id. at 401-02.
265. Id. at 404.
266. See Sullivan, supra note 255, at 1433-37.
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minimal. 6 7 For example, in Wyman v. James,"- a woman sought an
injunction barring a New York State welfare program (Aid to Families
with Dependant Children) from conditioning the receipt of aid on allowing
caseworkers to make warrantless inspections of her home. 69
In
rejecting the challenge, the Court held that the visits did not constitute a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Moreover, the
Court stated the plaintiff acted with free will in choosing to submit to, or
not to submit to, the visits." Consequently, the Court implied that the
coercive effect was not great enough to rise to the level of an
unconstitutional condition.'
Similarly, the Supreme Court has rejected challenges based on
unconstitutional conditions by distinguishing between a penalty being
imposed by the government as opposed to a refusal to subsidize an
activity.'
In Rust v. Sullivan, 4 the Supreme Court held that the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine did not apply to a federal program
which granted money to health clinics to be used for family planning,
while prohibiting the doctors at the clinics from using the money to
conduct abortion counseling. 5 The Court noted that a clinic, by
accepting this funding, was still free to conduct abortion counseling using
other funding. 76 Therefore, the Court held that the program did not
require that the clinics give up their First Amendment right to abortionrelated speech.2 n
While these cases indicate that the Supreme Court has only applied the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine in select situations, z21 mandatory
waivers of Fourth Amendment rights would seem to meet the requirements
of the doctrine. Unlike Wyman, sweeps are undisputedly searches within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 9 Further, a court has already
267. See id. at 1433.

268. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 324.
Id.
See Sullivan, supra note 255, at 1439.
500 U.S. 173 (1991).

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 196-99.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 198-99.
Sullivan, supra note 255, at 1416.
See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. I11.1994).
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found that such sweeps likely violate the Fourth Amendment.'
Consequently, the purpose of the consent forms is to avoid any
constitutional violations caused by warrantless searches and to sidestep the
Pratt decision."
Additionally, the current legal mainstream interpretation of the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine suggests that it will be applied when
the government penalizes, as opposed refusing to subsidize, an
activity.'
Moreover, the Supreme Court seems most willing to apply
the doctrine when fundamental rights, such as those enunciated in the First
Amendment, are involved.'
Bearing this in mind, mandatory waivers

are unlikely to pass constitutional muster. First, unlike the situation in
Rust, where the Court found that the clinics could still exercise their First

Amendment rights,'

once the tenants sign the forms, they have given

up their constitutional rights to be free from warrantless searches.

5

Therefore, the forms are not like denial of a subsidy, which would only
limit the context in which tenants could exercise their constitutional rights.
Rather, they constitute a penalty for those tenants who wish to exercise
their Fourth Amendment rights."
Also, like the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment is one of the
central guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Further, Fourth Amendment

rights are strongest within the confines of the home.M

Therefore,

requiring public housing tenants to sign a waiver giving away their Fourth
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Letter from Janet Reno & Henry Cisneros, supra note 244; Projects
and Police Raids, WASH. PosT, Apr. 19, 1994, at A14 (editorial) (stating that President
Clinton's proposals are implicit criticisms of the Prattdecision); Safety-for-Rights a Bad
Trade, Ci. TRiB., Apr. 19, 1994, at 22 (editorial) (stating that as a practical matter,
mandatory consent clauses defy the holding of the Prattdecision).
282. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an
Anachronism, 70 B.U.L. REv. 593, 601 (stating that every Supreme Court Justice has
adopted a position similar to the penalty/subsidy distinction of the doctrine).
283. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) ("modem decisions
invoking the doctrine have most frequently involved First Amendment liberties")
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
285. See, e.g., Taylor, supranote 68, at A4 (quoting Harvey Gross, legal director
of the Chicago ACLU as saying that the waivers require tenants to give up their right to
refuse searches).
286. See, e.g., id. (stating that constitutional law experts have concluded that the
waivers are vulnerable to a legal challenge because they would constitute the withholding
of a public benefit).
287. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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Amendment rights is likely to be found overly coercive and a violation of
the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions."
B. Voluntary Waivers
The Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development have suggested that any constitutional challenges based on
mandatory consent forms could be avoided by making these clauses.
optional, and by providing for the tenant's right to revoke consent when
police arrive for the search. 8 However, even if the government only
requests that public housing residents sign forms consenting to searches of
their apartments, in order for the consent to be valid it must be voluntary
in fact, and not the product of coercion.2 9 Moreover, in any criminal
proceedings that might arise out of a sweep, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving that the tenant's consent was not coerced. 290
Consequently, while non-mandatory consent forms might solve the
problem of a challenge to the overall policy, they would not prevent
individual tenants who sign the forms from later claiming that their
consent was coerced. 291
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,29 the Supreme Court held that
whether consent to a search is given voluntarily is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances. 2' Under a totality of
the circumstances test, no one fact is dispositive.294 Accordingly, in
Schneckloth, even though the defendant consented to a search of his car
without being advised that he could refuse consent, the Court held that the
consent was valid.' 9 In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a
consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by
implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly
the coercion was applied, the resulting 'consent' would
288. See GUIDANcE ON PUB. Hous. SEC., supra note 246.
289. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
290. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
291. Telephone Interview with Valerie J. Phillips, Public Information Director,
ACLU of Illinois (Mar. 6, 1995) (stating that the ACLU remains concerned that any
allegedly voluntary consent form used by the CHA is truly voluntary).
292. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
293. Id. at 227.
294. Id.
295. Id.

NOTE: SECURE IN THEIR HOUSES?

19951

be no more than a pretext for the unjustified intrusion
against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. 2'

Applying the same reasoning, courts have held that even when an
individual consents to a search after being told of her right to refuse
consent, and even after signing a form stating that she gives consent, the
consent may still be found to have been coerced.297

Therefore, even if a resident signs a "voluntary" consent form, that

fact alone is not determinative as to the voluntariness of the consent. 298

Consideration of the socio-economic factors that affect public housing

residents' lives might establish that their consent was coerced. 29 Issues
such as whether residents understand that they can refuse consent or
withdraw their consent later, as well as residents' fears that they may lose
their housing or become the subject of a criminal investigation if they do
not sign the consent form could result in a determination that consent is

actually the product of coercion.'
That such fears might be realistic is substantiated by the fact that
recently the CHA were found to have retaliated against tenants for
opposing CHA policies.2" In Herring v. Chicago Housing Authority,

Beverly Herring was a tenant of a CHA building that was subjected to a
"lockdown" in conjunction with "Operation Clean Sweep."'"
Following the "lockdown," Ms. Herring became involved with groups
organized to protest the CHA's search policies.'
In May of 1990, the
296. Id. at 228.
297. See, e.g., United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1456 (10th Cir. 1989)
(consent to search house found to be involuntary even though homeowner was advised
of her right to refuse consent, both orally and in writing, and even though she signed a
consent form); United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir. 1985) (consent
to search car found to be involuntary, even though defendant signed consent form stating
that he had the right to refuse consent).
298. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
299. See Robert V. Ward, Consentingto a Search and Seizure in PoorandMinority
Neighborhoods:No Placefor a "ReasonablePerson"36HoW. L.J. 239 (1993) (arguing
that factors such as race and poverty affect the ability to voluntarily consent to police
encounters).
300. See id. The Council of Large Public Housing Authorities voiced concern,
following announcement of the new proposals, that public housing tenants might feel
pressured to sign any consent clauses inserted into a public housing lease. See Gwen Ifill,
Clinton Asks Help on Police Sweeps in PublicHousing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, at

1.
301. See Herring v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 850 F. Supp. 694, 703 (N.D. Il1. 1994).
302. Id. at 696.
303. Id. at 697.
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CHA began eviction proceedings against Ms. Herring, ostensibly for
having violated the CHA "visitation policy."'
Upon review, the district court held that the CHA had actually sought
to evict Ms. Herring in retaliation for her protest activity and her

association

with

protestors

of the

CHA's

search

policies.'0 5

Accordingly, the CHA had violated Ms. Herring's First Amendment
rights.'30 7 The Herring case illustrates how it can be risky to oppose the
CHA.
In addition to fear of unauthorized reprisal by the CHA for failing to
sign a waiver, it has also been suggested that public housing authorities
might separate residents according to whether or not they have signed a
consent form. 35 The fear of being placed in a "non-consent" building

might also have an effect on residents which a court might find coercive.
Given the desperate situation many public housing residents are in,'

and given the Supreme Court's concern with the effect coercion can have
on consent,310 "voluntary" consent forms seem vulnerable to a court

challenge.
Provisions for allowing tenants to revoke their consent when the

police arrive are also vulnerable to claims of coercion. In considering
whether a police encounter is consensual, the Supreme Court has
suggested that factors such as whether there was the threatening presence
of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person, and the use of language or tone that compliance
might be required are to be considered. 1 Given the description of how
304. Id.
305. Id. at 700-01.
306. Id. at 703.
307. See Jane Juffer, Clean Sweep's Dirty Secret, CFH. READER, Oct. 5, 1990, at
1 (describing how the CHA has harassed and attempted to isolate those who have voiced
opposition to their security policies). In another case, a district court found that the
CHA had conducted searches of a tenant's apartment in retaliation for the tenant having
brought a suit protesting the CHA policy of evicting residents because of crimes
committed by their relatives outside of CHA property. See Turner v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., No. 89 C 5801, 1990 WI.. 104113 (N.D. I11.July 3, 1990).
308. See GUIDANCE ON PUB. Hous. SEC., supra note 246, at 4.
309. See, e.g., Robert Davis & Kevin Johnson, In Projects,it's 'Pop' vs. Privacy,
USA TODAY, Apr. 18, 1994, at 3A (describing CHA tenants' desperation for something
to make their homes safer).
310. See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
311. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
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the sweeps have been conducted in the past, all of these factors are

arguably present."
A sweep of a public housing apartment building involves a massive

show of authority.

Multiple officers are dispatched to search an

apartinent.3 13 The searches can be intrusive, involving not only rifling

through possessions, but also frisking tenants and looking into their

undergarments.3 4 During the searches, the buildings are sealed off and
access is restricted, sometimes for days. 15 Tenants can be ordered out
of their apartments or ordered to restrict their actions within their
apartments. 16 Under these circumstances, it is easy to see how an
individual might not feel free to tell a police officer that they are no longer

interested in consenting to a search.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under either a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis requiring that
searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued based on probable

cause, or the "special needs" doctrine, warrantless search policies such as
"Operation Clean Sweep" are unconstitutional. Moreover, the suggested

consent forms, either mandatory or voluntary, raise serious constitutional
questions.
The problems in our nation's housing projects are dire. However, the
solution should not be to sacrifice public housing residents' constitutional
rights. Such action only weakens the general public's constitutional rights,
while breeding contempt for the law by those whose rights have been
abdicated.317
312. See Ben Joravsky, Don't Sweep on Me: Unheard Voices of the CHA, CI.
READER, Apr. 22, 1994, at 3 (quoting Mark Pratt as saying that he didn't dare say

anything to the police as they searched him during a sweep).
313. See Juffer, supra note 307.
314. See Joravsky, supra note 312. The intrusiveness of the searches gives rise to
questions which the guidelines do not answer regarding the extent of what would be
permitted under a consent clause. See GuiDANcE ON PuB. Hous. SEC., supra note 246.
Generally, a consent search may not exceed the scope of the consent given by the
individual. See United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1419-20 (7th Cir. 1990)
(consent to open door panels is not normally included in consent to search automobile).
315. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 8, Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth. (No. 88-C10566) (stating that following the search of a building, it is closed to all visitors for 48
hours).
316. See Juffer, supra note 307.
317. Id. As Judge Anderson stated in Pratt, "[t]he erosion of the rights of people
on the other side of town will ultimately undermine the rights of each of us." Pratt v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. I11.1994).
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Alternative solutions to the problems at public housing projects must
be sought out. Former CHA chairman Lane proposed dispersing public

housing residents into middle income communities. 18

Around the

nation, large inner-city public housing apartment buildings are being
bulldozed and in their place smaller, more humane forms of public
housing are being erected. 19 Such innovative ideas should be pursued.

In the meantime, public housing projects must be made secure.
Vacancies at public housing projects have been identified as being a major
contributor to the danger. 3'
Vacant apartments must be rented, or
securely sealed off to prevent gang members from taking them over.

Physical decay is also a major contributor to the problem at public housing

projects. 32

Public housing apartment buildings must be repaired and

properly maintained. Also, ongoing regular police presence within the
public housing community, as well as searches of public areas and vacant

apartments can contribute significantly to the safety of public housing
projects.'
The answer to public housing security lies in these sorts of
measures, not in the sacrifice of constitutional rights by a group of people
so desperate for help they may be willing to agree to anything.
Charles Hellman

318. See, e.g., William A. Sampson, Revive the City by Re-Creating Community,
CI. TRIB., May 9, 1994, at 11 (suggesting that revitalization of communities can best
occur by creating incentives for middle-class people to move into poor neighborhoods).
319. See, e.g., Symbols of Policy Ills, Public High Rises Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 1995, at B5 (describing Newark Housing Authority's destruction of two high rises that
are going to be replaced by 300 town houses). In fact, the CHA has already razed some
of the apartment complexes subjected to "Operation Clean Sweep." See Edward Walsh,
Chicago Tries to Replace 'Castle' With Community; Cabrini-Green Residents Eye
Experiment Cautiously, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1995, at A3.
320. See Robert A. Davis, CHA VacanciesCreate Trouble Spots, CHI. SuN-TIMEs,
Oct. 17, 1995, at 4.
321. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 31. See also Mark Pratt, Insteadof Sweeps, CHA
Should Clean Up Its Act, CHI. SUN-TMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at 32 (editorial) (describing
the inefficacy of the sweeps and the sense of humiliation they create in CHA's CabriniGreen's residents).
322. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 63 (discussing the success of lawful "vertical
patrols" of CHA buildings by police).

